The Plantation Core Estate and Smallholders (PIR/Perkebunan Inti Rakyat) is a partnership scheme of the estates whereby a large estate acts as the core of development to small local farms in a mutually beneficial, integral, and continuous system. Simply put, PIR is one form of contract farming. The PIR scheme was first introduced by the Indonesia government in order to encourage the development in local farms. Moreover, the partnership system is based on patron-client relationship and regulated through a contract in which the large estate is the patron and local farms are the client. However, the PIR system involves state within the contract. The state's involvement is important so as to safeguard the interests of local farms (client) which are prone to predatory exploitation by the patron (large estate) and thus, balancing the bargaining powers of each party in the contract. This paper problematizes the contractual mechanism of PIR in respect to the freedom of contract. Thus, it can be concluded that the state's involvement in the PIR shows that the freedom of contract principles are rigged to a degree which restricts some of the patron's powers such as controls on supply and price in order to protect the local farms from being exploited.
Introduction
Plantation Core Estate and Smallholders is a pattern of plantation sub-sector development to realize business integration with the aim of improving the social-economic conditions of participating farmers and supported by various production, processing, and marketing activities by using large plantation companies as the core in a mutually beneficial cooperation system. 1
Relations in Plantation Core Estate and Smallholders are a mutually beneficial, whole and sustainable partnership relationship between large plantations and smallholder plantations. In addition, it has a theme or spirit of partnership which is a government initiative to create an ideal relationship pattern. However, the relationship is not familial but is carried out in a straightforward manner through a certain mechanism in the presence of the terms of the partnership pattern, the rights and obligations of the core company and the bank with participating farmers and stipulated in the cooperation agreement. to the thoughts of P.S. Atiyah about the withdrawal of the laissez-faire concept and the freedom of contact which follows below.
Result and Discussion
Freedom to contract is the freedom of the parties in an agreement to compile and agree to the contents of the agreement, without interference from the State. 2 Freedom to contract is much influenced by the development of free market ideas pioneered by Adam Smith and Jeremy
Bentham with the notion of utilitarianism. 3 Utilitarianism and the classical economic theory of laissez-faire are considered to be complementary and together revive the thoughts of individualistic liberals. The understanding of utilitarianism from Jeremy Bentham is closely related to classical political economy. 4 Both believe that individualism is a social value and mechanism, and freedom of contract is considered a general principle. have a weak position. To overcome this, the state intervened to protect the weak through regulations.
Gladstonian liberalism in its development has been replaced by Asquithian liberalism. At that time there was also an increase in attention towards the poor, the willingness to make statutory legislation to increase, and the people who received legislation that paid more attention to the interests of the community also increased. The principle of freedom of contract and laissez-faire that supports the interests of groups of entrepreneurs and industry to be free from the role of state regulation is no longer a symbol of Liberals and Radicals. The principle of freedom of contract and laissez-faire is considered only a slogan of conservatives who demand the absence of state interference. While the New Radicals instead demanded that more interference from the state. 9
In the 1880s the principle of freedom of contract practically ended as a political slogan.
Some evidence shows that this has become the view of politicians, political theorists, philosophers and drivers of social reform. 10 Economists argue that freedom of contract will provide maximum benefit if there is a distribution of welfare. If the distribution of welfare is unfair or unsatisfactory, what is produced by the agreement will reflect that injustice or dissatisfaction. 11
In its development, it turned out that the classical model agreement had failed. This is evidenced by the amount of state intervention in freedom of contract through legislation produced by the British Parliament since 1870. 12 The aforementioned conditions can apply in the relationship between core companies and banks and participating farmers in the implementation of Plantation Core Estate and Smallholders. Core companies and banks have the opportunity as parties with a stronger bargaining position than participating farmers. This imbalance of bargaining position often gives rise to agreements between core companies and banks with participating farmers who are one-sided or lame, unfair and violate propriety rules. So that the state needs to intervene to protect the weak parties.
Based on the problems mentioned above, the theory related to contracting freedom is expected to help analyze the mechanisms and partnership relationships in Plantation Core Estate and Smallholders between the parties involved, especially the core companies with participating 9 Ibid., page 583-585. 10 Ibid., page 587. 11 Ibid., page 614. 12 Ibid., page 693. At this stage, loans that were originally channeled to project implementers were transferred to participating farmers after the feasibility assessment. At this time the farmer acts as a debtor in a credit agreement with the bank.
c. Credit repayment phase
The third stage is the period of repayment of credit, which is after the participating farmers' farm produces oil palm. The proceeds from the sale of palm oil are partly to pay off credit.
Based on the above steps, credit assistance that was originally channeled to core companies will be transferred to participating farmers at the conversion stage. The conversion itself is the stage of transferring the plasma development credit burden from the Government or the core company to the burden of participating farmers on the submission of plasma plantation ownership to participating farmers. Another explanation states that the conversion stage is the period of transfer of rights or credit that has been issued for and on behalf of each PIR participant farmer by signing a credit agreement with the Bank.
14 Tim Khusus Proyek Perkebunan Inti Rakyat, Direktorat Jenderal Perkebunan, Perusahaan Inti Rakyat Perkebunan-Pelaksanaan dan Penilaian, (Jakarta: unpublished, 1 November 1992), page 5-2. 15 Ibid.,page. 4-7 dan 4-8.
The mechanism of repayment of the loan installments of PIR Farmers participating farmers is explained as follows. 16 a.
For regular repayment of credit installments, but still remaining a portion of farmer's income for maintenance costs and sources of welfare for farmers and their families, the amount of credit installments amounting to 30 percent is deducted from the income of the farmers' gross production to the core company (before costs are deducted, fertilizers, pesticides, and others). 17 b.
To speed up the repayment of its debt, it is possible that farmers pay more than 30 percent of their loan installments. However, payments are not justified at once. This is intended to prevent the sale of participating farmers' land to other parties. Payment at the same time is only possible with Local PIRs whose heirs do not reside on the site, causing the conversion to be unworkable.
c.
During the installment payment period, participating farmers are subject to current year interest, so that the installments paid will be calculated by the bank with priority for the current year's interest payments (including interest arrears if any) and the remainder to reduce the farmers' principal debt. Therefore, in principle, the delay or reduction in the percentage of credit installments will result in interest arrears so that the farmer's credit burden becomes bigger.
d.
In the event that the farmer participant has not been able to fulfill his obligation to pay a loan installment of 30 percent because the productivity is still low in the early years of the crop, it is possible that the participating farmers propose that the amount of the loan installment is below 30%.
Thus, participating farmers in PIR Plantation get credit assistance for the cost of building gardens, houses, clearing of land and food crops, land certificates, garden roads and an overhead cost of 10 percent which will be borne by the participating farmers. Repayment of credit Fourth, Sales of Oil Palm Fruit Participant Farmers. The post-conversion activities in the PIR Planting Pattern mechanism include one of the harvesting, processing, and marketing of the farmers' farm produce. 22 The three components are related to each other in relation to the conversion phase. Harvesting or collection of garden produce is an effort to reap the results of the business carried out when the plants are ready to be harvested, by maintaining and paying attention to the sustainability of plantation production. Meanwhile, processing is an effort to preserve or process production into a form that is ready for sale. While marketing is an effort to sell crops or the results of processing to get money as income for farming. The purpose of these activities is to increase the added value of raw materials processed and improve quality, diversify processed products and increase yield utilization, and provide processed materials that meet processing and profitable requirements. Then the results must be oriented to market demand. 23
After the conversion period, PIR Perkebunan participant farmers obtain income from crop yields on land for plantations, yard, and land for food crops. All plant products from the participating farmer's land are sold to the core company with a price formula set by the Government, for example for oil palm fruit calculated based on the formula for the price of Fresh Fruit Bunches (FFB) set by the Government.
The purchase price of palm oil fresh fruit bunches produced by farmers is based on a formula. Pricing and procedures for purchasing Fresh Fruit Bunches involve various aspects of activities and interests that need to be harmonized and directed in order to be able to support the continuation of mutually beneficial relationships between participating farmers and core companies. The formula needs to be established because the business relationship of the core company position tends to be stronger as a single buyer in remote areas. Participant farmers need to get protection from monopolistic practices that weaken the bargaining position of farmers. To benefit the parties, the selling price of the farmers' farm produce to the core company follows the price formula set by the Government. 24 As mentioned in the previous paragraph that the relationship between the parties, including between large plantations as the core company and participating farmers. in the People's Core Company Plantation is a straightforward and regulated relationship through a certain mechanism and a cooperation agreement is made. Some types of cooperation agreements referred to, among others, are Cooperation Agreements on Harvested Payments and Repayment of Participant (1) which stipulates that "The core company is obliged to buy all the crop yields of staple crops cultivated by participating farmers with quality according to the core company requirements and prices according to Government provisions". The clause in Article 2 paragraph (1) of this agreement which states that the price of the main crop of participating farmers according to Government provisions indicates that there is State interference in this agreement to protect the interests of participating farmers who are considered as weak parties. This is based on the consideration that the participating farmers' basic income is from oil palm fruit from their garden. The position of the core company is stronger as a single buyer in remote areas, so Digital Repository Universitas Jember farmers participating need to get protection from monopolistic practices that weaken the bargaining position of farmers. Therefore, in order for the purchase of participating farmers 'farm produce to benefit farmers, the selling price of participating farmers' oil palm fruit to the core company in the agreement is regulated following the price formula set by the Government. 25 Second, the Production and Sale Agreement of Palm Oil Fresh Fruit Bunches between Core Companies and Participating Farmers. Production and Sale and Purchase Agreement for Fresh Fruit Bunches (FFB) is an agreement to buy and sell oil palm fruit between core companies and participating farmers through farmer groups or Village Unit Cooperatives with PIR Plantation Patterns.Article 5 of the existing agreement contains provisions concerning the obligation of participating farmers that "Farmers must sell all Fresh Fruit Bunches to the Core Company to be processed and marketed and the Nucleus Company must purchase FFB delivered by Participating Farmers at prices according to the Government's stipulations. The core company has the right to buy all of the participating farmers' oil palm fruit to meet the raw material needs of the processing plant owned. While the participating farmers get guaranteed marketing of their garden products. This shows that in fact, the contents of the agreement on the main will of the parties are balanced or fair, where the parties both benefit. Article 5 of this agreement stipulates that the core company is obliged to buy oil palm fruit belonging to the participating farmers at prices in accordance with the provisions stipulated by the Government. The existence of this article shows that the State intervened to protect the interests of the participating farmers who were considered weak parties.
Article 9 regulates the force majeure that "In the event that part or all of the obligations of both parties cannot be carried out due to reasons other than the ability of both parties (force majeure), then this shall be conveyed to the relevant Government agencies for the steps to resolve them".The existence of State interference can also be seen in the provisions of article 9. This is in accordance with the thoughts of P.S. Atiyah that if the parties do not have the same training position, the State needs to intervene to protect the weak party. So that the agreement is expected to bring goodness to the parties, including farmers.
Conclusion
Plantation Core Estate and Smallholders aim to create a mutually beneficial, intact and sustainable relationship between large plantations and smallholder plantations. Relationships in 25 M. Badrun, op. cit., page 57. Digital Repository Universitas Jember
